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Abstract
Using the longest data set on FX order ﬂow to date, along with the broadest
coverage of currencies to date, we examine the effect of FX order ﬂow on exchange
rates across small and large currencies, currencies with ﬂoating or ﬁxed regimes,
and across both tranquil and turbulent periods. Over our 15 years of data for
eleven Asian and Australasian currencies, we ﬁnd that order ﬂow has a poten-
tially strong impact on all exchange rates in the sample. The effect is strongest
on ﬂoating exchange rates, both economically and statistically, but is sizeable also
on the other exchange rates, especially during periods of turbulence. By creating
a measure of regional order ﬂow, we show that all exchange rates depreciate as
ﬂows are moved out of Asia/Australasia and into US dollars. This is true both
across regimes and if their own ﬂow is not included in the structure of the re-
gional ﬂow.
JEL: F31, G01, G15
Keywords: Order ﬂow, microstructure, Asian and Australasian exchange rates,
ﬁnancial crises
1 Introduction
Exchange rate movements have proven notoriously difﬁcult to explain using macro-
economic fundamentals, leading Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) to coin the term “ex-
change rate disconnect puzzle.” Several ﬁnancial crises over the past two decades
have not made the problem any easier to solve. The ERM crisis in Europe in the
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1early 1990s was followed by the Mexican peso crisis in the mid-1990s, the Asian crisis
and the Russian sequel in the late 1990s, the bursting of the dot-com bubble together
with crises in both Turkey and Argentina at the beginning of the new century, the
global ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2009 and the current sovereign debt crisis in Europe.
These crises affected different economies to different degrees, but no economy was
unaffected.
In response to the lack of a plausible explanation for what drives exchange rates,
researchers have begun to take a new approach that focuses on the potential impli-
cations of heterogeneity among market participants.1 Such heterogeneity has often
been suggested as a key ingredient in explaining both the disconnect between funda-
mentals and asset prices in general and the occurrence of ﬁnancial crises.
This approach, when applied to foreign exchange (FX) markets, is often called the
microstructure approach to FX and was pioneered by Evans and Lyons in a series
of papers.2 The results so far are astonishing in that their key variable, net buying
pressure for currency (or order ﬂow), appears to be a key determinant of exchange
rates. In some cases more than 50% of the variation in returns have been explained by
variation in order ﬂow, numbers unheard of for macroeconomic fundamentals (Evans
and Lyons, 2002a,b).3
Order ﬂow is deﬁned as the net of buyer- and seller-initiated trades in foreign
(base) currency, and has a positive (negative) value if there is net buying (selling) pres-
sure by initiators. Hence, the focus is on the action of only one party to a trade, where
the initiator is the one paying transaction costs to settle the trade. In microstructure
theory, a link between asset price and order ﬂow arises because the very act of being
willing to pay transaction costs reveals information about trading motives. In a setting
with heterogeneous investors, these trading motives may be of relevance to the price
determination process. A simple example is an equity market with (some unknown)
insiders, where the market maker can detect noisy signals of insider information by
observing the order ﬂow.
Under reasonable conditions for the heterogeneity of the market participants, these
trades will actually occur in equilibrium, and order ﬂow will be non-zero, as opposed
to the predictions from e.g. models of symmetric information. Hence, order ﬂow is a
natural variable for capturing the heterogeneity that we hypothesize as being essen-
tial to explaining exchange rate movements. Understanding the type of heterogeneity
reﬂected by order ﬂow, and hence the source for its explanatory power, remains an
active research area. Evans (2010) argues that order ﬂow reﬂects dispersed informa-
tion on shocks that originate at the micro-level (among households and ﬁrms) and
that in the aggregate constitutes macroeconomic shocks. The idea is that macroecon-
omic variables are aggregates of decisions at the ﬁrm and household level, and due to
publication lags at the aggregate level, market participants are able to learn about the
macroeconomy in real time by observing the trading of ﬁrms and households. Evans
ﬁnds support for this view in that the trading of Citibank’s customers can be used to
forecast shocks to the macroeconomy. Others, like Froot and Ramadorai (2005) and
1Studying implications of investor heterogeneity for asset price determination is not new, and
did not originate from exchange rate economics. The approach, often labeled market microstructure,
initially focused primarily on equity markets (see O’Hara, 1995).
2Lyons (2001) and Evans (2011) give excellent overviews of the ﬁeld and its development.
3See Osler (2009) and Evans and Rime (2012) for overviews of the empirical literature.
2Berger, Chaboud, Chernenko, Howorka, and Wright (2008), have questioned such a
fundamentals-based view of the impact of order ﬂow and believe it is due to changes
in risk premiums related market clearings during portfolio shifts and liquidity dis-
ruptions. However, under both views, a positive order ﬂow (net buying pressure on
base currency) leads to an appreciation of the base currency.
One major obstacle to studying order ﬂow has been data availability, both in terms
of currencies and with respect to length of samples. In this paper, we contribute to
the literature on FX microstructure in several ways. First, we examine a larger set
of currencies than has hitherto been the case. We study eleven currencies from the
Asian and Australasian region, covering both highly liquid currency pairs as well as
less liquid pairs, and currencies under different monetary regimes. Second, to our
knowledge, we have the longest data set studied in the literature, covering 15 years,
including both tranquil and turbulent periods.
The eleven currencies studied, all quoted against the US dollar, are: the Australian
dollar, the Hong Kong dollar, the Indian rupee, the Japanese yen, the South Korean
won, the Malaysian ringgit, the New Zealand dollar, the Philippine peso, the Singa-
pore dollar, the Thai baht and the New Taiwan dollar. Most of the previous literature
has focused on major exchange rates, such as the euro, the Japanese yen and the
British pound against the US dollar. To our knowledge, only a few earlier papers
have studied the order ﬂow of Asian currencies other than the yen.4 Gyntelberg, Lore-
tan, Subhanij, and Chan (2009) study almost two years of customer trading in the Thai
baht, while Smyth (2009) study ﬁve years of interbank trading in the Australian dol-
lar and the New Zealand dollar.5 With respect to length of sample, Chinn and Moore
(2011) use eight years of data on the US dollar against the euro and the Japanese yen
from January 1999, and omits the Asian and Russian crises of the late 1990s.6
This paper uses data obtained from Reuters interdealer trading platforms. Trades
in the interbank market are those between foreign exchange dealers of large banks,
generally reﬂecting rebalancing of portfolios and risk sharing following transactions
with end-customers, e.g. businesses, central banks and asset managers. The data
provide us with tick-by-tick information on trades and bid-ask exchange rates in the
different currency pairs. This enables us to generate reliable measures of order ﬂow
and measures of market liquidity, such as relative bid-ask spreads.
With these data in hand, we can examine whether the strong explanatory power
of order ﬂow found elsewhere in the empirical literature on FX microstructure also
applies to Asian currencies in general, and to less liquid currencies in particular.
Given the length of our data set, it is possible to see whether the relationship is robust
to extending samples. More importantly, since the sample extends from early 1996 to
the present for the majority of the currencies, we are able to study the role of order
ﬂow during periods of turbulence. This is important, because turbulent times are
periods when both theory and data so far have provided us with little guidance.
4Ito and Hashimoto (2006), studying the Japanese yen and euro against the US dollar, provide some
details on intraday patterns during Asian trading hours.
5Fong, Valente, and Fung (2010) is a another exception, conducting a microstructure analysis of
the Hong Kong Dollar. Their focus is different however, in that they examine deviations from covered
interest rate parity and its relation to liquidity.
6Breedon, Rime, and Vitale (2010) use ten years of data on order ﬂow to study the forward rate
bias.
3We do not take a strong position in the debate on the structural reasons for any
impact of order ﬂow on exchange rates. Rather, following the approach of e.g. Chor-
dia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002), we document that the strong impact of order
ﬂow is a very robust result across levels of liquidity, both in tranquil and turbulent
periods, and even across exchange rate regimes. We ﬁnd a strong impact for relatively
liquid currencies like the Australian dollar and the New Zealand dollar, but also for
smaller currencies, some of which are under more ﬁxed exchange rate regimes, such
as the Indian rupee, the Singapore dollar, the Thai baht, the New Taiwan dollar, and
the Hong Kong dollar. Although the effect is strongest both in economic and statis-
tical terms on the ﬂoating currencies, we do ﬁnd that a region-wide outﬂow into the
US dollar creates depreciatory pressure on all eleven currencies. This includes small
currencies under more ﬁxed exchange rate regimes, such as the Malaysian ringgit
and the Philippine peso, and currencies known to be subjected to relatively large and
frequent interventions, such as the South Korean won. Furthermore, as expected, the
effect of order ﬂow is strongest during periods of turmoil, when market participants
have the greatest need for aggregating information.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the FX
market and our data, while section 3 presents our results using the full sample length.
Section 4 describes the crises in our sample and presents the results from studying
these. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Data and the Market
2.1 Exchange Rates
In this section we describe and discuss the different exchange rates being studied, and
the data set on the interbank FX markets. Our trading data (more details below), in
some cases going back to January 8, 1996, and extending to October 5, 2011, cover
all major currencies of the Asia-Paciﬁc and Australasian region except the Chinese
yuan and guide us in our selection of exchange rates. Speciﬁcally, we examine the
Australian dollar (AUD), the Hong Kong dollar (HKD), the Indian rupee (INR), the
Japanese yen (JPY), the South Korean won (KRW), the Malaysian ringgit (MYR), the
New Zealand dollar (NZD), the Philippine peso (PHP), the Singapore dollar (SGD),
the Thai baht (THB) and the New Taiwan dollar (TWD), all quoted against the US
dollar (USD). For all these currencies, the USD is the base currency, i.e. exchange rates
are stated as foreign currency units (FCUs) per 1 USD, apart from the exchange rates
of Australia and New Zealand. By foreign exchange market convention, the currency
of these two Commonwealth nations is the base currency when quoted against the
USD. However, for clarity of presentation, these exchange rates are also stated as
FCUs per 1 USD here, i.e. the USD is treated as the base currency. For all exchange
rates, we use daily closing mid-quotes obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream.
The size of these markets may be seen in Table 1, which presents the average
daily global total spot volume from the Bank for International Settlements’ (BIS) 2010
triennial global survey of foreign exchange markets, together with each currency’s
share of this total. The combined percentage share of average daily turnover in the
foreign exchange market of these eleven currencies was 33.3% as at April 2010 (BIS,
4Table 1
Global Spot Volumes and Local Currency Share of Total
1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
Global 474,740 637,154 461,066 656,906 996,279 1,490,205
AUD 1.93 % 2.57 % 3.56 % 5.15 % 5.25 % 7.46 %
HKD 0.84 % 0.87 % 1.54 % 1.09 % 1.56 % 0.68 %
INR 0.08 % 0.31 % 0.46 % 0.90 % 0.58 %
JPY 22.06 % 23.58 % 26.05 % 20.86 % 20.50 % 20.15 %
KRW 0.35 % 1.48 % 1.67 % 1.51 % 1.02 %
MYR 0.02 % 0.07 % 0.06 % 0.16 % 0.28 %
NZD 0.20 % 0.16 % 0.32 % 0.79 % 1.72 % 1.32 %
PHP 0.03 % 0.05 % 0.05 % 0.13 % 0.15 %
SGD 0.42 % 2.15 % 0.71 % 0.82 % 0.84 % 1.05 %
THB 0.11 % 0.14 % 0.21 % 0.12 % 0.19 %
TWD 0.25 % 0.58 % 0.57 % 0.55 % 0.41 %
Note: The table presents the global total spot volumes, in USD millions, across all currencies against all other currencies, and
across all different counterparties, corrected for local and cross-border double-counting. Each subsequent line states the share of
local currency, against all other currencies, as a share of the global total. Since both currencies in a trade are counted, the sum
over all currencies will be 200%. Source: BIS Triennial Survey.
2010).7 Thus, almost $500 billions worth of daily transactions included one of these
eleven currencies on one side. The ﬁve largest currencies (in descending order) in
percentage of average total daily turnover in our sample are the JPY, the AUD, the
NZD, the SGD, and the KRW, respectively. The smallest are (in descending order) the
TWD, MYR and PHP.
Most of the Asian currencies in our sample were to a varying degree pegged to the
US dollar prior to the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997. Between 1990 and 1997, the MYR
moved within a 10% range of 2.7 2.5 ringgit per USD, the THB was effectively ﬁxed
between 25.2 and 25.6 baht per USD, while the PHP ﬂuctuated between 24 to 28 pesos
per USD between 1990 and 1995 before being effectively ﬁxed at 26.2 until 1997. The
KRW followed a somewhat more ﬂexible path, depreciating over the period 1990–97
with short periods of narrower bands, while the SGD followed a path of appreciation
over the period 1990–97, taking it from a rate of 1.7 to 1.4 per USD. The TWD was
under a real exchange rate targeting regime, which led to a nominal depreciation of
roughly 16% between 1990 and 1997 (Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, 1999).
The INR was allowed to ﬂoat in 1993 after decades of being pegged to the British
pound, thus joining the region’s major ﬂoating currencies — the AUD, the JPY, and
the NZD. The HKD, on the other hand, is the region’s most rigid currency, as it is
under a strict currency board regime, which effectively pegs it to the US dollar at 7.8
per USD.
In the years following the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, the currencies in the sample can
7Because two currencies are involved in each transaction, percentage shares add up to 200% instead
of 100%.
5be divided into three categories according to de jure exchange rate policy.8,9 Floating
currencies: the AUD, the JPY, the KRW and the NZD; managed ﬂoating currencies:
the INR, the MYR (since the summer of 2005), the PHP, the THB and the TWD,
currencies subject to a peg/basket/band: the HKD, the MYR (prior to the summer of
2005) and the SGD.
The daily closing mid-quotes for all exchange rates are plotted in Figure 1 together
with cumulative order ﬂow (to which we return below). The periods of the Asian and
Russian ﬁnancial crises and the 2007–09 ﬁnancial crisis are shaded in the ﬁgure. The
start of the Reuters Dealing data is evident from the start of the cumulative order ﬂow
data, if later than January 8, 1996. Hence, for the INR we have transaction data from
July 14, 2003, while for the KRW, the PHP, the THB and the TWD our trading data
starts on September 20, 2004.
A notable increase in exchange rate volatility during periods of ﬁnancial distress
can be seen from Figure 1. All currencies, apart from the HKD, experience a steep
depreciation relative to the US dollar during the Asian/Russian ﬁnancial crises. The
same pattern also holds for the 2007–09 ﬁnancial crisis, except for the JPY. This effect is
not surprising, given the global dominance of the US dollar as a ‘safe-haven’ currency
in times of distress.
The case of the JPY, which can be seen in Figure 1d to actually appreciate roughly
20% over the entire course of the global ﬁnancial crisis, is not surprising given the
yen’s dominant role as a funding currency in the carry trade. This makes the JPY
appear to be a ‘safe-haven’ currency when uncertainty increases. The spill-over from
the global ﬁnancial crisis to the FX market reduced exposure to the carry trade and
hence led to upward pressure on the yen as market participants sought to unwind
their short yen holdings (Melvin and Taylor, 2009).
The reason that the HKD was not affected by ‘a ﬂight to liquidity’ is its strict
currency board regime, which in effect pegs it to the USD. The HKD can be seen to
undergo a controlled depreciation against the USD in the years following the Asian
ﬁnancial crisis, from 7.75 to 7.8 HKD per USD.
From Figure 1f it is evident that the Malaysian authorities managed to maintain the
MYR’s peg from the latter stages of the Asian/Russian ﬁnancial crises until mid 2005.
The time series properties of the MYR from Table 7 are thus somewhat surprising.
However, the ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate prior to — and after — the end of the
peg, are substantial enough to reject a unit root with a p-value of 0.17 over the entire
sample.
Descriptive statistics for daily annualized percentage exchange rate returns over
the respective currencies’ Reuters sample are povided in Table 2, panel a). On an
average day, the AUD, for instance, appreciated at an annual rate of 1.58% against the
USD. Given that the USD is the base currency for all exchange rates, Table 2 tells us
that except for the HKD, the INR, the KRW and the MYR, all currencies on average
delivered a positive daily return relative to the USD over the sample. Furthermore, the
daily returns, with the notable exception of the HKD, exhibit high volatility as given
8This follows the various issues of the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions, published annually.
9In this paper we do not go into the empirical distinction between de jure and de facto exchange rate
policies. For a recent investigation of de facto exchange rate policies in several East Asian countries, see
Kim, Kim, and Wang (2009).
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(f) Malaysian ringgit (MYR)
Note: Exchange rates are daily spot closing mid-quotes, plotted for the period 1/08/1996 – 10/05/2011 (right axis). All exchange
rates are stated using the US dollar (USD) as base currency. Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream. Cumulative order ﬂows are
cumulative sums of daily order ﬂow, plotted for each individual currency’s Reuters Dealing platform sample ending 10/05/2011
(left axis). Sample details given in the text. Shading indicates the 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis (deﬁned as occurring between
6/01/1997 – 7/31/1998), the 1998 Russian Financial Crisis (between 8/1/1998 – 10/31/1998) and the 2007–09 Global Financial
Crisis (between 7/01/2007 – 3/31/2009).
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Note: See previous graph for details.
8by their standard deviations. The result for the HKD is no surprise, given its peg. The
result of lower exchange rate volatility for ﬁxed exchange rates relative to ﬂoating
exchange rates is documented by Klein and Shambaugh (2010). Moreover, all return
distributions are leptokurtic, which indicates that tail risk is relatively high. The THB
has the ‘fattest tails’ by far, which indicates the highest tail-risk of the currencies in
our sample. The THB is furthermore the only currency in our sample that exhibits
double digit ﬁrst order autocorrelation in its daily exchange rate return. Testing the
time series properties of the exchange rates reveals that they all (by usual degrees of
conﬁdence) contain a unit root, apart from USD/HKD and USD/KRW. Augmented
Dickey-Fuller tests for the exchange rates are provided in Table 7 in the appendix.10
2.2 Trading in the Foreign Exchange Market
The FX market is predominantly an over-the-counter market, where trading is typ-
ically divided into two tiers, the interbank market and the bank-customer market.
Customers are parties with the ﬁnal demand for currency, while the interbank market
is a very important and efﬁcient vehicle for banks to manage and share the risk they
assume when intermediating customer trades. Historically, the foreign exchange mar-
ket has been decentralized, with trading spread across several locations and with sev-
eral dealers providing liquidity. Furthermore, the trading process has been opaque;
for example, banks are typically not required to disclose information on their trad-
ing with end-users, which they often are required to do in equity markets. If the
hypothetical hedge fund AggressiveInvest bought x THB worth y USD billion, this is
information that remains with the bank that executed the trade. The decentralized
and opaque nature of trading, and the fact that banks predominantly act as inter-
mediaries for customers and therefore desire to keep a neutral position themselves,
ensure that the customer market and the interbank market are linked in important
ways.11 In case of the hypothetical hedge fund AggressiveInvest above, the bank in
question would probably ofﬂoad the volume in the same direction in the interbank
market, hence ensuring that the interbank order ﬂow reﬂected the customer trade.
In the interbank market, dealers can trade with each other directly in the form of
bilateral trades, or trades via brokers. Nowadays both kinds of trades are primarily
done electronically, the former over “chat”-like networks and the latter via electronic
brokers. In the early 1990s, bilateral trades were the preferred channel, but after the
introduction of electronic brokers, broker-mediated trades soon came to dominate.
The dominant role of electronic brokers is more pronounced in the liquid exchange
rates, while the direct channel still retain a sizeable share of trading in the less liq-
uid currencies. The dominant platform for direct trading is the Reuters D2000-1, or
Dealing Conversational as it is also called.
Electronic brokers, which match orders from screens linked together in networks
10Test results not reported here, show that the rejection of a unit root in the USD/KRW exchange
rate does not hold when considering the sample for the Reuters-data (p-value of 0.48). This is also
clear when looking at the USD/KRW exchange rate right of the vertical line in Figure 1e. The ADF-test
of the USD/TWD exchange rate reported in Table 7 further shows a p-value of 0.09. Test results not
reported here, show that when considering the sample for the Reuters data, this p-value rises to 0.41.
11Although major FX banks do proprietary speculative position-taking in FX markets, the volumes
devoted to this are small compared to their intermediary liquidity providing role.
9Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Exchange Rates
Mean s r(1) Skew. Kurt. p90 p10 Obs.
a) Exchange rate return
AUD -1.58 213.14 -0.06 0.40 14.72 224.68 -218.56 4,075
HKD 0.04 8.15 -0.08 -2.85 60.89 6.13 -5.76 4,073
INR 0.80 107.90 -0.01 0.06 9.47 118.50 -110.26 2,123
JPY -1.93 176.41 -0.02 -0.44 9.15 198.97 -198.12 4,075
KRW 0.48 217.48 0.07 -0.08 33.15 174.19 -173.45 1,828
MYR 1.38 137.02 0.06 0.44 60.11 71.85 -71.02 4,014
NZD -0.94 209.70 -0.01 0.36 6.76 239.74 -233.94 4,072
PHP -3.44 109.17 -0.08 0.19 12.97 117.87 -122.53 1,812
SGD -0.54 94.53 -0.04 -0.20 14.22 95.36 -96.16 4,071
THB -3.85 154.97 -0.24 0.51 123.82 94.12 -109.78 1,833
TWD -1.37 76.82 0.02 -0.21 6.61 83.63 -88.17 1,824
b) Relative bid-ask spreads
AUD 4.00 1.90 0.80 3.83 67.97 6.45 2.16 4,076
HKD 0.73 0.36 0.84 0.98 6.66 1.29 0.26 4,073
INR 3.13 2.24 0.24 5.49 45.80 4.50 1.69 2,124
JPY 4.98 2.30 0.63 4.04 47.68 8.22 2.62 4,076
KRW 7.70 8.72 0.48 4.02 26.03 17.07 1.95 1,829
MYR 7.99 10.38 0.84 4.93 50.67 14.84 1.29 3,903
NZD 8.84 5.25 0.50 19.84 831.00 13.77 4.01 4,073
PHP 12.63 7.46 0.51 0.97 4.43 21.65 4.52 1,813
SGD 5.36 3.15 0.86 3.80 23.44 7.10 3.08 4,072
THB 11.70 9.57 0.43 6.08 57.83 16.48 5.19 1,834
TWD 9.35 9.39 0.68 1.33 3.15 27.36 2.57 1,825
Note: Panel a) of the table presents descriptive statistics for the daily exchange rate returns (daily change in log exchange rate) in
percent per year, calculated as the daily change in log exchange rate times 100 and using 250 trading days per year. All exchange
rates are expressed as using the US dollar (USD) as the base currency. Panel b) of the table presents descriptive statistics for the
daily relative bid-ask spreads, the median of the intraday bid-ask spread divided by the mid-quote, expressed in basis points.
Reported statistics for both panels are the mean (Mean), standard deviation (s), ﬁrst order autocorrelation (r(1)), skewness of
the distribution (Skew.), kurtosis of the distribution (Kurt.), the 90th- and 10th- percentiles (p90 and p10) of the distribution, and
the number of daily observations (Obs.)
10provide each dealer in the interdealer market with a more centralized marketplace
and more efﬁcient matching. Two electronic brokers exist in today’s foreign exchange
market: Reuters Dealing 3000, a successor to the Reuters Dealing 2000-2 introduced
in April 1992, and EBS (Electronic Broking Services). EBS was established in Septem-
ber 1993, and acquired the short-lived Minex platform launched by Japanese banks
six months earlier. The market has settled on a fragmentation, where EBS dominates
trading the US dollar against the euro, the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen, whereas
Reuters dominates trading in the British pound, the currencies of other Common-
wealth nations and minor currencies (Rime, 2003; Ito and Hashimoto, 2006).
A further implication of the arrival of electronic platforms for the interdealer mar-
ket, as well as for customers, is increased cost-effectiveness and greater competition.
Lower transaction costs are one of the drivers of increased turnover in the foreign
exchange market over the last 20 years (King and Rime, 2010; King, Osler, and Rime,
2012).
In this paper, we use data on trading in the interbank market obtained from the
Reuters trading platforms. Data for the most liquid currencies in our sample were ob-
tained from the Reuters electronic broker, the Reuters Dealing 2000-2/3000 platform.
Data for the smaller currencies in our sample, speciﬁcally the KRW, the MYR, the
PHP, the THB and the TWD were obtained from the conversational (“chat”) platform
Reuters D2000-1, on which the majority of trades is carried out. The data obtained
from the Reuters interdealer platforms provide, on a tick-by-tick basis, signed trans-
actions, volumes and bid-ask spreads. For the following six currencies we have data
back to January 8, 1996: the AUD, the HKD, the JPY, the NZD, the SGD, and the MYR.
Observations for the INR start July 14, 2003, whereas observations for the KRW, the
PHP, the THB, and the TWD start September 20, 2004. All series end October 5, 2011.
Daily series are compiled by aggregating over 01:00 to 18:00 GMT, capturing the hours
with the most trading activity as documented by King et al. (2012). The cumulative
order ﬂow for each exchange rate is shown in Figure 1. Over such a long time series
the cumulative ﬂows appear to be very smooth. In canonical microstructure models,
it is unexpected order ﬂow that moves asset prices (see e.g. Evans, 2011), and we will
later use the difference of the cumulative ﬂow together with lagged difference of ﬂow
as a proxy for the unexpected portion in our empirical implementation.
Table 2 panel b) presents descriptive statistics for relative bid-ask spreads for the
eleven exchange rates. Relative bid-ask spreads are stated in basis points of the mid-
quote. The bid-ask spreads are quite narrow over the entire sample. On average, a $1
million round-trip transaction in the JPY would cost $498. Furthermore, spreads have
declined over the sample for all currencies exept the KRW and the MYR (see Figure 4
below). The same round-trip transaction in the JPY would only have cost about $250
at the beginning of October 2011, a roughly 50% reduction in transaction costs relative
to the average over the 15-year sample period.
It appears from Table 2 panel b) that the cross-section pattern of relative bid-
ask spreads is not exclusively one of liquidity, as given by each currencies’ share
of average total daily spot volume reported by the BIS. In particular, the spread in
the USD/HKD exchange rate is by far the narrowest of the group, averaging only
0.73 basis points over the entire sample. Furthermore, its spread shows the lowest
volatility among the eleven, with a standard deviation of 0.36 basis points, and a high
persistence with a ﬁrst order autocorrelation of 0.84. Low and predictable trading
11costs for the HKD are not surprising, given the stationarity of the exchange rate, a
reﬂection of the HKD’s strict currency board regime.
At the other end of the scale are the THB and the PHP. Both have double-digit
roundtrip transaction costs as stated in basis points, and relatively high volatility and
low persistence in their spreads. From Table 1 it is evident that these are the two
smallest currencies in our sample in terms of the share of average total global spot
volume. Although these currencies were ﬁxed to some degree, panel a) of Table 2
shows that although controlled through managed ﬂoating arrangements, daily price
movements on average have been substantial — in fact, the largest of the eleven cur-
rencies.
Between these extremes we ﬁnd the major ﬂoating currencies: the AUD, the JPY,
and the NZD. These currencies are the region’s largest in terms of shares of total
global spot volume, accounting for nearly 87% of the combined share of the region
as a whole from Table 1. This degree of liquidity is reﬂected in the relative spreads
in the interbank market shown in Table 2 panel b). The AUD/USD and USD/JPY
exchange rates have relatively narrow and persistent spreads with low volatility. The
relative spread in the NZD/USD exchange rate, however, is nearly twice that of the
AUD and the JPY, averaging 8.84 basis points over the sample with lower persistence
and much higher volatility. Furthermore, the distribution of the NZD/USD relative
spreads is highly leptokurtic and positively skewed, indicating fat tails particularly at
the high end of the distribution. These results seem plausible, given that the NZD is
by far the least liquid of the major ﬂoating currencies in our sample.
Table 3 panel a) presents descriptive statistics for daily order ﬂow in the eleven
exchange rates. We do not have information on the volume of each trade. Order
ﬂow is therefore derived by matching the transaction price with the ask or bid price
and creating a trade indicator that takes the value +1 ( 1) if the initiator of trade
bought (sold) the base currency. Daily order ﬂow is the sum of the trade indicators
from 01:00 to 18:00 GMT. Earlier studies (Killeen, Lyons, and Moore, 2006; Lyons and
Moore, 2009) have shown that using volume-based rather than indicator-based order
ﬂow yields very similar results, probably because in the interbank market, trades are
largely standardized at minimum volume of 1 million units of base currency. The ﬁrst
column of Table 3 panel a) shows that on average the AUD, the JPY, the NZD, the
THB and the TWD experienced daily net USD selling-pressure, whereas the opposite
holds for the remaining currencies.
When the average daily order ﬂow is viewed in the context of the carry trade, the
average daily buying-pressure on the AUD and the NZD make sense. In a carry trade
an investor buys high interest rate currencies and sells low interest rate currencies.
This is tantamount to betting that the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) will not
hold over the investment horizon, in other words, that movement in the exchange rate
will wipe out the gain from the interest rate differential. Given the positive interest
rate differentials of the AUD and the NZD relative to the USD over the sample, we
would expect the ﬂow in these crosses to result in net USD selling pressure. The fact
that the JPY is a major funding currency for the carry trade, and given its negative
interest rate differential relative to the USD over most of the sample, we would expect
average ﬂows to result in net buying -pressure on the USD in this cross. The lack of
such a pattern for the JPY in our data warrants some careful consideration. Shift of
trading in the JPY from Reuters onto the EBS platform may imply that our data from
12Reuters is not sufﬁciently representative to capture such trends — an implication we
will explore in detail in sections 3 and 4.
Daily order ﬂows are quite volatile, as their standard deviations indicate. In par-
ticular, our two main currencies for the carry trade on the Reuters platform, the AUD
and the NZD, are among the three currencies with highest volatility in daily order
ﬂow. The ﬁrst order autocorrelation appears modest for most of the exchange rates,
with the KRW and the PHP being possible exceptions. All distributions of daily order
ﬂow, apart from that of the KRW, are leptokurtic.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics of FX Quantities
Mean s r(1) Skew. Kurt. p90 p10 Obs.
a) Interbank order ﬂow
AUD -16.36 271.50 0.11 0.44 7.80 278.00 -293.90 4 076
HKD 3.15 31.12 0.19 0.23 9.14 38.00 -26.10 4 074
INR 27.61 126.54 0.27 0.18 4.54 183.00 -116.00 2 124
JPY -34.76 61.24 0.42 -0.11 5.17 30.00 -111.00 4 076
KRW 6.72 64.21 0.72 0.31 2.64 97.00 -72.00 1 829
MYR 0.77 7.18 0.19 0.80 20.72 7.00 -5.00 4 015
NZD -7.17 103.56 0.12 0.47 11.76 82.00 -108.20 4 073
PHP 7.42 15.57 0.67 -0.01 4.09 27.00 -11.00 1 813
SGD 10.21 57.82 0.20 0.94 9.66 73.00 -45.00 4 072
THB -5.24 17.43 0.22 2.33 33.26 11.00 -24.00 1 834
TWD -20.30 21.85 0.54 0.02 4.11 4.00 -47.00 1 825
b) Volume (number of trades)
AUD 5 394 5 221 0.89 1.64 6.26 13 093 707 4 076
HKD 402 306 0.88 1.25 4.25 863 125 4 074
INR 1 245 936 0.78 0.80 2.86 2 708 220 2 124
JPY 1 062 609 0.77 1.37 6.51 1 838 405 4 076
KRW 122 58 0.73 0.75 3.47 207 57 1 829
MYR 48 61 0.87 2.48 10.90 120 6 4 015
NZD 1 471 1 483 0.87 1.35 4.80 3 591 196 4 073
PHP 39 21 0.67 0.49 2.98 67 12 1 813
SGD 659 578 0.88 1.66 7.21 1 422 102 4 072
THB 109 65 0.72 1.64 8.05 194 46 1 834
TWD 92 31 0.42 -0.12 4.45 130 59 1 825
Note: Panel a) of the table contain descriptive statistics for interbank order ﬂow on the Reuters platforms. Order ﬂow is the daily
sum of buyer initiated trades (on the ask-quote) minus the sum of seller initiated trades (on the bid-quote) between 01:00 and
18:00 GMT. Panel b) of the table contain descriptive statistics for the daily total number of trades. All exchange rates are stated
using the US dollar (USD) as the base currency. Reported statistics for both panels are the mean (Mean), standard deviation (s),
ﬁrst order autocorrelation (r(1)), skewness of the distribution (Skew.), kurtosis of the distribution (Kurt.), the 90th- and 10th-
percentiles (p90 and p10) of the distribution, and the number of daily observations (Obs.)
Table 3 panel b) presents descriptive statistics for the daily volume of trading in
the currency pairs in the sample, given by the total number of daily trades in the base
currency of each exchange rate. Two of the major ﬂoating currencies of the region,
13the AUD and the NZD, stand out with large volumes of trading relative to the others.
The daily average of trades in the USD/JPY exchange rate is illustrative of the shift
of trading in the JPY onto the EBS platform. Table 1 shows that the JPY’s share of
global average daily turnover has remained fairly constant since 1995, while total
global average turnover has increased more than threefold. The average daily trading
volume in the JPY should dwarf the volumes of the two Australasian currencies in our
sample, given its global importance. Figure 2 plots the volumes over time. Figure 2d
shows that daily trading volume in the JPY has all but evaporated over the last 15
years on the Reuters platform, consistent with the shift onto the EBS platform. Two
implications of trading data in the JPY are thus important for our subsequent analysis:
First, although trading on the Reuters and EBS platforms might be correlated, if all
informative trading in this cross is on the EBS platform, our results would be expected
to suffer and have low explanatory power and statistical signiﬁcance of order ﬂow;
second, results for the JPY should be stronger in the early years of our sample (when
trading activity in the JPY on the Reuters platform were larger) than in later years. We
include the JPY in our subsequent analysis to shed light on this hypothesis, but the
paucity of data regarding the JPY should be borne in mind when drawing conclusions.
The lack of trading in the PHP on the Reuters platform is also a concern regard-
ing our data. The special structure of the Philippine interbank market is reﬂected in
the high relative bid-ask spread in panel b) Table (2) and the low volume of trading
in panel b) Table (3). In the Philippines, commercial banks that are members of the
Bankers Association of the Philippines and the central bank trade foreign exchange
through the Philippine Dealing System (PDS).12 As for the JPY, Reuters interdealer
data might suffer from such a lack of trading activity, possibly limiting the infor-
mational content of ﬂows. Results for the PHP in our subsequent analysis, though
interpreted with care, are expected to reﬂect this paucity of data and have low eco-
nomic and statistical signiﬁcance and low explanatory power.
Another feature of Figure 2 is the steep increase in volume in nearly all exchange
rates over the past decade, which accords with the 2010 triennial report from BIS.
Apart from the JPY and the TWD, all currency pairs exhibit this pattern of higher
daily trading volume. The trading volumes in the USD/MYR exchange rate shown in
Figure 2f are a result of the successful peg maintained by the Malaysian authorities.
Trading volumes plummeted in the latter stages of the Asian and Russian ﬁnancial
crises, and remained at very low levels until the peg was relaxed over the summer
of 2005. The New Taiwan dollar is another interesting case, evincing a nearly stable
volume over the entire sample. Table 3 panel b), also show that daily volatility in
the volume of trading in the TWD is low compared with most other currencies. In
addition, the volume of TWD trading is the least autocorrelated, and the TWD is the
only currency whose distribution shows a (slight) negative skewness.
3 Long-Run Results
In the portfolio shifts model of Evans and Lyons (2002b), order ﬂow conveys informa-
tion that FX markets need to aggregate. Hence, order ﬂow is a proximate determinant
12A thorough description of the Philippine interbank market is given in the IMF’s Annual Report on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.
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Global Financial Crisis (between 7/01/2007 – 3/31/2009).
15Figure 2







1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010









2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011







1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010









2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011








2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
(k) New Taiwan dollar (TWD)
Note: See previous graph for details.
16of exchange rates. In particular, net purchasing pressure on the USD (positive order
ﬂow) should increase the price of the USD. We estimate the impact of order ﬂow on
each individual currency as
Dst = a + b0xt + b1xt 1 + lDst 1 + #t, (1)
where Dst is the change in the log of the closing mid-quote exchange rate, using the
USD as base currency, between day t 1 and t multiplied by 100, and xt is order ﬂow
over day t standardized by its standard deviation. The speciﬁcation further controls
for price movements and order ﬂow from the previous trading day, Dst 1 and xt 1,
respectively. The ﬁrst control captures feedback-trading (though autocorrelation for
most currencies were found in Table 2 to be modest), while the second control is a
simple way to account for predictable order ﬂow which cannot represent the non-
public information order ﬂow impact supposedly captures. The approach taken here
is closely related to that of Chordia et al. (2002) and Chordia and Subrahmanyam
(2004) for US equity markets.
Results from the estimation of equation (1) for each currency are presented in the
ﬁrst row (I) in Table 4. Estimates of the contemporaneous effect of order ﬂow on
exchange rates, b0, are given in the column OF. Estimated coefﬁcients of the effect
of lagged returns and order ﬂow, l and b1 are not reported in order to save space.
Furthermore, the adjusted R2s reported are those of a separate regression using only
contemporaneous order ﬂow, excluding controls. This approach has been chosen to
illustrate the explanatory power of the contemporaneous order ﬂow alone. Two main
conclusions can be drawn from the estimation of equation (1): First, order ﬂow is
correctly signed and is an economically signiﬁcant determinant of the exchange rates
of all currencies except the KRW. The positive sign on order ﬂow implies that increase
in net buyer initiated trades (trades on ask) increased the price of the USD measured
in the FCU. Second, order ﬂow is statistically signiﬁcant (measured by high t-values)
for all exchange rates but the USD/PHP.
The economic effect of order ﬂow can be illustrated by the AUD.13 As row (I) of
Table 4 shows, a one standard deviation increase in net USD purchasing pressure on
average appreciates the USD 0.47% relative to the AUD, or about 55% of the standard
deviation in daily returns. As a comparison, Evans and Lyons (2002b) found that
a $1 billion net purchasing pressure appreciated the USD on average 0.54% relative
to the Deutsche mark. Assuming that as a lower bound the average trade in the
AUD/USD is at Reuters platform minimum of $1 million, a one standard deviation
increase in order ﬂow amounts to about $272 million in our sample. The effect of
order ﬂow is thus somewhat stronger in our data, but one have to be aware that
this is a lower limit (making the difference less clear) and that the lower liquidity
of the AUD compared to the Deutsche mark probably also contributes to a higher
price impact. Similar economic signiﬁcance in relation to the standard deviation of
annualized daily returns is found for most of the other exchange rates, excluding the
incorrectly signed coefﬁcient for the KRW and the statistically insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient
for the PHP: HKD 41%; INR 47%; JPY 26%; MYR 10%; NZD 49%; SGD 36%; THB
20%; TWD 29%.
13Economic effect of order ﬂow is here the order ﬂow coefﬁcient times order ﬂow standard deviation
relative to exchange rate volatility.
17Table 4
The Long-Run Effect of Order Flow
OF Int.rate Slope Equity Vol. R2 Obs.
AUD I 0.4655 0.29 4074
(25.67)
II 0.4474 -0.6622 -0.5163 0.0466 0.5379 0.34 4068
(26.85) (-2.03) (-2.82) (4.13) (3.89)
HKD I 0.0132 0.15 4072
(11.82)
II 0.0132 -0.0087 -0.0009 0.0000 0.0011 0.17 4066
(11.76) (-3.01) (-0.38) (-0.01) (0.42)
INR I 0.2034 0.20 2122
(15.84)
II 0.1894 -0.0132 0.0154 -0.0135 0.1971 0.25 2116
(14.25) (-0.12) (0.14) (-2.99) (4.22)
JPY I 0.1833 0.05 4074
(9.01)
II 0.1701 -2.1715 -2.4105 -0.0306 -0.5622 0.18 4068
(8.96) (-8.50) (-10.05) (-4.87) (-9.21)
KRW I -0.2459 0.01 1827
(-6.98)
II -0.2047 0.6384 0.6568 -0.0695 0.5081 0.19 1821
(-6.23) (1.88) (2.25) (-4.35) (5.58)
MYR I 0.0547 0.01 4013
(7.42)
II 0.0518 0.2089 0.2000 -0.0253 0.1642 0.04 4009
(7.48) (1.34) (1.21) (-4.50) (4.34)
Note: The table presents results from the estimation of the Evans and Lyons (2002b) portfolio shifts model for each exchange rate,
using the USD as the base currency, over the Reuters interdealer sample at a daily frequency. All speciﬁcations are estimated
using Ordinary Least Squares with Newey-West Heteroscedastic and Autocorrelation Consistent standard errors. The reported
numbers are coefﬁcient-values from two different regression-formulations, with t-values given in parenthesis below. The number
of daily observations for each currency pair is given in the last column (Obs.). Row (I) column OF, gives the coefﬁcient estimate
of b0 for each exchange rate from the regression
Dst = a + b0xt + b1xt 1 + lDst 1 + #t,
where Dst is the change in the log of the closing mid-quote exchange rate between day t   1 and t multiplied by 100, and xt
is order ﬂow over day t standardized by its standard deviation. The adjusted R2 in row (I) is from a separate regression with
only contemporaneous order ﬂow (no lags). Row (II) includes the change in the 3-month interest rate differential between the
country in question and the U.S. (Int.rate), the change in the difference of the slope of the yield curve calculated as a two year
government bond less the 3-month interest rate between the country in question and the U.S. (Slope), the change in the equity
index return differential between the country in question and the U.S. (Equity), and the change in the 3-month implied volatility
of the J.P. Morgan VXY index (Vol.).
18Table 4
The Long-Run Effect of Order Flow (Continued)
OF Int.rate Slope Equity Vol. R2 Obs.
NZD I 0.4131 0.24 4071
(19.13)
II 0.3968 -0.2968 -0.3058 0.0588 0.3991 0.28 4065
(20.64) (-1.51) (-1.87) (6.14) (4.86)
PHP I 0.0146 0.00 1811
(0.83)
II 0.0012 0.2300 0.1871 -0.0163 0.1860 0.06 1805
(0.07) (2.73) (2.30) (-3.93) (4.40)
SGD I 0.1379 0.13 4070
(16.50)
II 0.1382 0.2239 0.1638 -0.0013 0.0430 0.15 3564
(16.99) (1.70) (1.28) (-0.36) (1.32)
THB I 0.1254 0.04 1832
(8.27)
II 0.1242 0.1674 0.1573 0.0027 0.0721 0.10 1826
(8.34) (1.34) (1.38) (0.43) (1.36)
TWD I 0.0903 0.05 1823
(8.66)
II 0.0810 0.1099 0.1467 -0.0124 0.0672 0.09 1817
(7.71) (0.96) (1.33) (-4.39) (2.58)
Note: See previous Table for details.
19As a second speciﬁcation, some proxies for public information that might inﬂuence
the price determination of exchange rates are included, and as such is closer to the
portfolio shifts model of Evans and Lyons (2002b). Macroeconomic information at
a daily frequency is scarce. In order to check for the robustness of the order ﬂow
impact, we choose to incorporate a rather broad set of publicly available variables
given the frequency: the three-month interest rate differential; the difference of the
slope of the yield curve, calculated as a two year government bond less the three-
month interest rate between the country in question and the U.S.; the equity index
return differential between the country in question and the U.S.; and the J.P. Morgan
VXY volatility index.14 All variables are in ﬁrst-differences in order to avoid problems
of non-stationarity. The second speciﬁcation thus amounts to

























+ fvD(vxyt) + #t, (2)
where the ﬁrst part is equivalent to equation (1) and the rest of the variables are
deﬁned above.
The motivation for the use of interest rate differentials needs no further justiﬁ-
cation. The yield curve slope is included to capture inﬂation expectations. The in-
clusion of equity return differentials is motivated by Hau and Rey (2006). Hau and
Rey develop a model in which exchange rates, equity returns and portfolio equity
ﬂows are jointly endogenously determined. In their model, higher equity returns in
a given currency are associated with a depreciation of the currency, which amounts
to an “uncovered equity parity”. Our speciﬁc motivation for including the J.P. Mor-
gan VXY volatility index is based on the recent contribution by Menkhoff, Schmeling,
Sarno, and Schrimpf (2011), who show empirically that global FX volatility inﬂuence
the returns to individual currencies.15
The results from the estimation of equation (2) are presented in the second row
(II) for each currency in Table 4. As above, the estimates of the contemporaneous
effect of order ﬂow, b0, are given in the column OF, while the effects of lagged returns
and order ﬂow, l and b1, are not stated. The coefﬁcient estimates on the public
information variables are reported in the columns Int.rate, Slope, Equity and Vol. (for
volatility).
Adding a whole set of publicly available information in the second row for each
currency in Table 4 does little to change our results for the order ﬂow impact. The
explanatory power of the second speciﬁcation is somewhat greater than that of order
ﬂow alone, but the coefﬁcient estimates of order ﬂow and their statistical signiﬁcance
are stable.
For relatively large currencies such as the AUD, the HKD, the INR, the NZD
and the SGD, explanatory power is high compared to what is usually found when
14All of the interest rates and the J.P. Morgan VXY index are obtained from Thomson Reuters
EcoWin. Daily equity returns are computed using the FTSE country-speciﬁc equity indices provided
by Thomson Reuters Datastream.
15The J.P. Morgan VXY index is a volatility index based on implied volatilities from currency options
of G7 countries, and should thus serve as a reliable proxy for global FX volatility.
20conditioning on public information variables alone, and almost all of the explanatory
power comes from order ﬂow. This conﬁrms earlier results like that of Evans and
Lyons (2002b). However, for some currencies the increase in explanatory power when
adding public information variables is substantial. The adjusted R2 of, e.g., the JPY
and the KRW, increases from 5% to 25% and from 1% to 31%, respectively. The low
explanatory power of contemporaneous order ﬂow for the JPY stands out amongst
the major currencies. However, given the paucity of our data with regard to the
JPY discussed in section 2.2, this is no surprise. The hypothesis that virtually all
informative trading in the JPY is now on the EBS platform appears to be plausible.
The results for the KRW and the PHP require some special attention. We believe
the negative estimate of contemporaneous order ﬂow on the KRW to be best explained
in the light of the crises in our sample, and defer a special treatment of the KRW to
section 4. Given the paucity of our data regarding the PHP discussed in section 2.2,
the lack of signiﬁcance and explanatory power is not surprising given that a majority
of interbank trading in PHP is on the PDS and not on Reuters. In addition, the PHP
is the least traded currency in our sample, accounting for only 0.15% of average daily
spot FX volume (BIS, 2010).
Interestingly, the results on the impact of order ﬂow do not ﬁt into a cross-sectional
taxonomy of either liquidity or exchange rate regimes. For instance, Table 1 shows
that the AUD is the second most traded currency in our sample and has the largest
economic effect of order ﬂow. The INR is the seventh most traded currency in our
sample according to the BIS, and yet has the third largest economic effect of order
ﬂow. Results are also somewhat surprising with regard to exchange rate regimes.
Killeen et al. (2006) develop a model linking the effect of order ﬂow to exchange rate
regimes where portfolio shifts affect exchange rates more under a ﬂexible regime. The
intuition is that return volatility shrinks to zero under perfectly credible exchange
rates, causing rational investors to be more willing to absorb portfolio shifts without
fear of asymmetric information than in more ﬂexible and volatile exchange rates. In
our sample, the HKD is the most rigid currency, yet has the fourth largest economic
effect of order ﬂow. Indeed, the small movements of the USD/HKD exchange rate
allowed within the currency board regime are in large part explained by order ﬂow,
while we would expect order ﬂow not to be a determinant for a credibly ﬁxed cur-
rency like the HKD. Of course, one could argue that the effect is due to the dividing
by a small number (HKD-return standard deviation), but this does not explain why
the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly different from zero.
As for the public information variables, the results are to a large extent as expected
given earlier problems of ﬁnding clear effects from macroeconomic variables. The
notable exception is the effect of FX volatility. In the case of increased uncertainty in
the FX market, one would expect to see ‘a ﬂight to safety’. This would amount to a
depreciation of the currencies in our sample relative to the USD, as investors move
into the USD. Apart from the JPY, the effect of volatility is correctly signed for all
currencies, and statistically signiﬁcant for seven out of the eleven. The case of the JPY
is somewhat special, given the yen’s dominance as a funding currency for the carry
trade. In the event of market turbulence, the yen is often found to appreciate because
of its ‘safe-haven’ status and the unwinding of carry trade positions. The effect for
the yen is furthermore strongest of all the currencies. Our results are similar to those
found by Menkhoff et al. (2011).
21The results as presented in Table 4 are strong for the six currencies constituting our
longest sample; the AUD, the HKD, the JPY, the NZD, the MYR and the SGD. This
motivates a more thorough analysis of the effect of order ﬂow in the region as a whole
using these six currencies. Due to the wide range of currency regimes in Asia, the
problems associated with de jure exchange rate classiﬁcation, and the varying degrees
of liquidity in our currencies, we would expect a high degree of noise in the effect
of order ﬂow for individual currencies —at least for the least liquid ones. Several
contributions to the literature have studied the effect of order ﬂow in one currency
pair on the return in another pair (see Evans and Lyons, 2002a; Lyons and Moore,
2009; Dan´ ıelsson, Luo, and Payne, 2011). Two papers in particular are close to our
hypothesis of a regional order ﬂow effect. Evans and Lyons (2002a) develop a model
in which a link between information in one currency pair and return in another arises
because of dispersed information coupled with the portfolio problem of allocating
wealth across all currencies. Evans and Lyons further document empirically that the
order ﬂow in the German mark and Swiss franc against the USD have substantial
impact on returns in a four month long sample of other less liquid European curren-
cies. Dan´ ıelsson et al. (2011) document cross-market order ﬂow effects in the major
exchange rates: EUR/USD, EUR/GBP, GBP/USD and USD/JPY. Dan´ ıelsson et al. at-
tribute this to the possibility of information on a single currency being exploited at
the lowest cost in the most liquid exchange rate. Liquidity providers in the less liq-
uid exchange rates involving the same currency will, however, be cognizant of this
incentive and adjust quotes accordingly.
Our contribution to the literature on cross-market order ﬂow effects is that of us-
ing principal components. In line with conclusions by Evans and Lyons (2002a) and
Dan´ ıelsson et al. (2011), a common regional ﬂow may possibly be of greater impor-
tance for the currency movements of individual countries in the Asia-Paciﬁc region
than individual ﬂows. Table 5 presents the results from SUR (Seemingly Unrelated
Regressions) systems with three different speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst SUR system is speci-
ﬁed with individual returns in all the eleven exchange rates estimated on the principal
component of the ﬂows of the six currencies with the longest sample: the AUD, the
HKD, the JPY, the NZD, the MYR and the SGD. The second speciﬁcation is the same
as the ﬁrst, except that the principal component of the ﬂows of the three major ﬂoat-
ing currencies of the region, the AUD, the JPY and the NZD, are used instead. Finally,
the third SUR system uses all six individual ﬂows from the ﬁrst system as right-hand
side variables.
The ﬁrst column of Table 5 shows results from the ﬁrst speciﬁcation of the SUR
system. Apart from the JPY, order ﬂow is now correctly signed and highly statisti-
cally signiﬁcant for all currencies. All exchange rates load positively on the common
regional component. This also holds for the KRW and the PHP, the two troubling cur-
rencies from Table 4. In second column of Table 5, the HKD, the MYR and the SGD
are excluded from the creation of the principal component ﬂow, and only the region’s
major ﬂoating currencies are used. The sensitivity of the loadings of each currency,
excluding the JPY, is minimal, an indication that a regional ﬂow is highly dependent
upon the information in the three major currencies of the region. The third column of
Table 5 shows the loadings of the eleven exchange rates on each of the six individual
ﬂows used to construct the principal component in the ﬁrst system, giving a similar













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23Summing up our long-run results for Asian and Australasian currencies, we ﬁnd
that order ﬂow is an important determinant of exchange rates in the region. Both
in economic and statistical terms, order ﬂow is key to modeling the price change
of Asian-Paciﬁc currencies. Furthermore, we ﬁnd a strong depreciatory effect of a
region-wide outﬂow into the US dollar on all currencies in the region.
4 Turbulence
As noted above, a number of ﬁnancial crises occurred around the world during the
two decades since the early 1990s. In section 4.1 we begin our analysis of order ﬂow in
periods of market distress with a brief description of the crises we believe have been
most important for the Asia-Paciﬁc region within the range of our sample. Section 4.2
contains our empirical results regarding order ﬂow and crises periods.
4.1 Turbulence in the Foreign Exchange Market
To illustrate periods of turbulence, we plot the Chicago Board Options Exchange
(CBOE) VIX index and the J.PP Morgan G7 FX-volatility VXY index in Figure 3. The
two volatility-indices, both based on implied volatilities, are complementary but also
show that the crises of the early 2000s mentioned above did not have a particularly
severe impact on the FX market. We will focus on three crises in our empirical analy-
sis: the 1997–98 Asian ﬁnancial crisis, the 1998 Russian (LTCM) crisis and the 2007–09
global ﬁnancial crisis. The periods of these three crises are indicated in Figure 3 by
shading.
During the 1997–98 Asian ﬁnancial crisis (here deﬁned as occurring between June
1, 1997, and the end of July 1998), uncertainty in global ﬁnancial markets soared, as
shown by the jump in the VIX index in Figure 3. The slight impact on the VXY FX-
volatility index indicates that with respect to the FX market this was a regional crisis,
and the major G7 currencies underlying the VXY did not experience a similar increase
in volatility.16 The Russian ﬁnancial crisis (deﬁned as occurring between August 1,
1998, and the end of October 1998), which required bail-out of Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM), had an even greater ripple effect on the global ﬁnancial system
than did the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, as measured by the VIX index in Figure 3. The
subsequent unwinding of the yen carry trade during the fall of 1998 led to a massive
appreciation of the USD/JPY exchange rate and an increase in FX volatility.17 During
the 2007–09 global ﬁnancial crisis (deﬁned as occurring between July 1, 2007, and the
end of March 2009), both the VIX and the VXY index can be seen to reach all-time
highs after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, illustrating the severity of the crisis for
ﬁnancial markets.18
Two key features of FX markets during periods of distress, are increased trading
volume and increased volatility of bid-ask spreads (Lyons, 2001; Melvin and Taylor,
16See Corsetti et al. (1999) for a thorough account of the build-up of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis.
17See Kharas, Pinto, and Ulatov (2001) for an account of the Russian ﬁnancial crisis.
18See Brunnermeier (2009) for an account of the early stages of the 2007–09 global ﬁnancial crisis,
Rose and Spiegel (2010) for cross-country causes and consequences, and Melvin and Taylor (2009) for
an excellent account of the speciﬁc implications for the foreign exchange market.
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Note: The ﬁgure shows the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX), and the J.P. Morgan G7 Volatility
Index (VXY), plotted from January 8, 1996 – October 5, 2011. Shading indicates the 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis (deﬁned as
occurring between 6/01/1997 – 7/31/1998), the 1998 Russian Financial Crisis (between 8/1/1998 – 10/31/1998) and the 2007–09
Global Financial Crisis (between 7/01/2007 – 3/31/2009).
2009). Figure 2 shows increased trading volume in all currencies in our sample during
the crises. This is not an indication of greater liquidity, but rather evidence of the “hot
potato trading” (see Lyons, 2001) and reluctance to take on inventory (see Melvin and
Taylor, 2009). Also, quite naturally, heterogeneous interpretation of rapidly moving
public information will lead to high volumes in turbulent times.
Relative spreads for the eleven exchange rates over our sample are given in Fig-
ure 4. As in the ﬁndings of Melvin and Taylor (2009), volatilities of bid-ask spreads
in our sample are highly inﬂuenced by market distress. Figure 4 shows pronounced
spikes during the crises for all currencies but the HKD. Furthermore, large ﬂuctua-
tions in spreads occur for all currencies over the sample. The fact that the relative
bid-ask spread for the USD/HKD exchange rate does not appear to be inﬂuenced
by market distress in the same manner as the other exchange rates, is not surprising
given the HKD’s strict currency board regime.
4.2 Order Flow and Turbulence
The implications for the FX market of the crises discussed above prompt the question
of whether or not order ﬂow is stable through periods of distress. Figure 5 presents
rolling coefﬁcient estimates of the effect of contemporaneous order ﬂow on exchange
rate returns, b0, from the model in equation (1). The model is estimated using a rolling
sample length of 250 observations (roughly one trading-year), re-estimated for every
observation. The series of rolling coefﬁcient estimates are plotted using the last date
of each rolling sample. Thus, each plotted estimate in Figure 5 is the estimate over
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Note: Graphs show the 60-day moving average of relative spreads (bid-ask spread divided by the mid-point exchange rate)
measured in basis points. All exchange rates, except the Australian dollar (AUD) and the New Zealand dollar (NZD), use
the US dollar (USD) as base currency. Shading indicates the 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis (deﬁned as occurring between
6/01/1997 – 7/31/1998), the 1998 Russian Financial Crisis (between 8/1/1998 – 10/31/1998) and the 2007–09 Global Financial
Crisis (between 7/01/2007 – 3/31/2009).
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27estimates is the 95% conﬁdence interval.
Figure 5 clearly shows that the impact of order ﬂow is even greater during times
of distress in the FX market. During the 1997–98 Asian ﬁnancial crisis and its Russian
sequel, the coefﬁcient estimates of order ﬂow increases — for all currencies with a
sample spanning these two crises. Pronounced peaks in economic and statistical sig-
niﬁcance appear in Figure 5. Coefﬁcient estimates and statistical signiﬁcance during
the 2007–09 global ﬁnancial crisis provide a similar picture.
We check for time-varying effects by interacting order ﬂow with time-dummies,
thereby obtaining the excess effect of order ﬂow during crises. Table 6 presents results
from the estimation of equation (2) using a dummy variable for each of the three
crises in our sample; the 1997–98 Asian ﬁnancial crisis (dAsia), the 1998 Russian
ﬁnancial crisis (dRus) and the 2007–09 global ﬁnancial crisis (dGFC). We also include a
dummy variable indicating the current sovereign debt crisis (dSDC). Since the current
crisis is still ongoing at the time of writing, this dummy simply takes on the value 1
from beginning of May 2010 when a dramatic escalation of the Greek sovereign debt
crisis triggered huge volatility in ﬁnancial markets. The effects of publicly available
information from equation (2) and return and order ﬂow from the previous trading
day have been omitted from the table for clarity of presentation.
On the basis of the results in Table 6, two main conclusions can be drawn. First,
the effect of order ﬂow for exchange rate determination is not a result mainly driven
by turbulence in the FX market. Second, the effect of order ﬂow is time-varying and
particularly strong during periods of market distress.
The coefﬁcient estimates of order ﬂow in the column OF of Table 6 is the effect of
order ﬂow on daily exchange rate return net of the crises in our sample. A comparison
of these estimates with those of row (II) of Table 4 reveals strikingly small differences.
The effect of order ﬂow is thus omnipresent in the foreign exchange market, and
not dominated by a few volatile sub-periods. The exception to this consistency is
the coefﬁcient for the JPY. The JPY order ﬂow estimate and its statistical signiﬁcance
excluding all crises falls more than for the other currencies in our sample. This ﬁnding
is in line with the hypotheses laid out in section 2.2. Although the interpretation of
the JPY estimates requires some caution, the declining importance of the Reuters
platform for the USD/JPY exchange rate is apparent in the data. The dividing-up
of the effect of order ﬂow over time impacts the JPY hard in that its trading volume
on the Reuters platform peaked during the Asian/Russian ﬁnancial crises, as seen in
Figure 2d. Furthermore, in our data, the effect of order ﬂow for the JPY monotonically
declines from the Russian ﬁnancial crisis onwards. This is a result of the decline of
importance of the Reuters interdealer platform from the beginning of our sample to
the end.
The results in Table 6 clearly indicate a time-varying effect of order ﬂow. The
region’s major ﬂoaters — the JPY, the AUD, and the NZD — all show a signiﬁcant
increase in the importance of order ﬂow during the crises (though one must bear
in mind the special considerations regarding the JPY). Coefﬁcient estimates indicate
that during the Russian ﬁnancial crisis, for example, the impact of a one standard
deviation increase in net USD buyer-initiated trades increased the daily return on the
AUD by an additional 1.7% — a strong effect.
Considering the HKD, the MYR and the SGD in addition to the regions’ major
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7/01/2007 – 3/31/2009).
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30Table 6
The Time-Varying Effect of Order Flow
OF dAsia dRus dGFC dSDC R2 Obs.
AUD 0.4853 1.0713 1.7153 0.4725 0.3041 0.34 4068
(22.81) (5.09) (5.84) (12.33) (12.21)
HKD 0.0135 0.0142 0.0133 0.0129 0.0129 0.17 4066
(7.05) (6.08) (2.44) (6.42) (6.48)
INR 0.1829 0.2606 0.1102 0.28 2116
(13.31) (8.30) (5.97)
JPY 0.0967 0.3160 0.6352 0.1309 0.1057 0.26 4068
(5.51) (9.19) (4.60) (2.92) (1.26)
KRW -0.1326 -0.2288 -0.1244 0.31 1821
(-4.94) (-4.14) (-3.33)
MYR 0.0282 0.0567 0.6517 0.1211 0.0836 0.10 4009
(5.68) (1.43) (1.43) (5.50) (3.40)
NZD 0.4436 1.0739 1.1154 0.3742 0.3010 0.26 4065
(16.33) (6.52) (3.49) (10.95) (7.47)
PHP 0.0012 0.0474 -0.0307 0.08 1805
(0.06) (1.99) (-1.34)
SGD 0.1528 2.3887 1.9999 0.1385 0.0951 0.21 3564
(13.99) (7.15) (3.53) (8.62) (5.68)
THB 0.1354 0.1387 0.0916 0.10 1826
(7.20) (2.99) (7.80)
TWD 0.0623 0.0889 0.0865 0.11 1817
(4.88) (6.80) (6.15)
Note: The table presents results from a regression similar to equation (2), with the difference that order ﬂow is allowed separate
effects during each crisis by using interaction with dummy-variables. dAsia measures the effect of order ﬂow during the Asian
crisis, dRus measures the effect during the Russian crisis, dGFC the global ﬁnancial crisis, and dSDC the sovereign debt crisis.
All coefﬁcients on the public information variables and lagged order ﬂow and return are suppressed to save space.
31constituting our longest sample. Order ﬂow is even more important for price deter-
mination in the FX market during crises. All coefﬁcient estimates are economically
and statistically signiﬁcant, apart from the effect during the 1997–98 Asian and Rus-
sian ﬁnancial crises for the MYR. This is no surprise, when one looks at Figure 2f,
and is directly attributable to the successful pegging of the ringgit by the Malaysian
authorities during the later stages of the Asian/Russian crises. This ﬁnding for the
MYR as return volatility approaches zero is consistent with Killeen et al. (2006).
Finally, a look at the ﬁve currencies in our sample with shorter sample length; the
INR, the KRW, the PHP, the THB and the TWD upholds our results to a large degree.
There is a strong time-varying effect of order ﬂow. The insigniﬁcant effect of order
ﬂow in the USD/PHP exchange rate in all periods but the global ﬁnancial crisis, is
possibly due to the special structure of interbank trading in the PHP.
The KRW stands out throughout our analysis. The effect of order ﬂow is per-
sistently found to be negative and signiﬁcant, i.e. net USD purchases are found to
appreciate the won relative to the dollar. In our view, a plausible explanation for this
puzzle for the won is noisy data on order ﬂow and market intervention. First, the
informational content of order ﬂow in the USD/KRW exchange rate appears to be
somewhat limited, as indicated by both the limited explanatory power of order ﬂow
alone in Tables 4 and 6, and the signiﬁcant loading of daily returns on the principal
components over the entire 15-year-long sample in Table 5. Second, the consistently
negative effect of order ﬂow is not primarily driven by the dominance of certain sub-
periods in our sample, as shown by the rolling order ﬂow coefﬁcient estimates in
Figure 5e. Third, the South Korean central bank is known to intervene frequently in
the FX market, without disclosing any information about such activity publicly (Park,
Chung, and Wang, 2001). Figure 6 plots the won together with the VXY. The won
experienced a huge depreciation of roughly 40% following the collapse of Lehman
Brothers. Figure 6 shows that this depreciation of the won may plausibly be a story
of risk. One interpretation is that the South Korean central bank failed to intervene
when market conditions deteriorated so sharply.
5 Summary
Prior to the development of the microstructure approach to FX, the study of exchange
rates was in a state where nearly all possible explanations for explaining exchange
rate movements appeared to be exhausted. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001), and Flood
and Rose (1995), concluded that the major drivers of exchange rates were not macro-
economic. However, the microstructure approach, and its use of data on the trading
decisions by market participants, has provided some hope that we can move forward
and ﬁnd satisfactory models for these important macroeconomic asset prices. Order
ﬂow, the aggregate of trading decisions of initiators of foreign exchange transactions,
has been shown to be capable of explaining a signiﬁcant share of the movements in
exchange rates. The problem, however, has been the difﬁculty of verifying these ﬁnd-
ings for a wide range of currencies over long sample periods. Typically, the sample
length has either been rather short, or the coverage of different currencies has been
limited. Sample lengths have varied from one week to eight years, with the majority
being a few years or less. Although several currencies have been studied in the litera-
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Note: The ﬁgure shows the South Korean won (KRW) quoted against the US dollar (USD) and the J.P. Morgan G7 Volatility
Index (VXY), plotted from September 20, 2004 – June 24, 2011. The black vertical line indicates September 15, 2008, the day
Lehman Brothers ﬁled for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.
ture, the majority of these studies have been on major exchange rates —the euro, the
Japanese yen and the British pound against the US dollar— and few on the currencies
of Asia.
This paper is an examination of the longest data set on order ﬂow studied to date,
covering altogether eleven Asian and Australasian currencies (against the US dollar).
Our data set includes all the major currencies of the Asia-Paciﬁc region except the
Chinese yuan. Speciﬁcally, we study the Australian dollar, the Hong Kong dollar,
the Indian rupee, the Japanese yen, the South Korean won, the Malaysian ringgit, the
New Zealand dollar, the Philippine peso, the Singapore dollar, the Thai baht and the
New Taiwan dollar. To our, seven of these eleven currencies have never been studied
before. Among these eleven are currencies under a purely ﬂoating regime, currencies
that have changed regime over the sample, and currencies that have been ﬁxed over
the full sample. The length of our data enables us to study the impact of order ﬂow
over several ﬁnancial crises. With data extending from January 1996 to October 2011,
we can even study the impact of the recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe on these
Asian and Australasian currencies.
We conﬁrm previous results that order ﬂow is a very strong predictor of exchange
rate movements. This is especially true for ﬂoating exchange rates such as the Aus-
tralian dollar and the New Zealand dollar. These results are sustained over the full
15-year sample, an indication that the impact of order ﬂow is robust both to the choice
of currencies (with different levels of liquidity) and the choice of periods. Currencies
under a more ﬁxed exchange rate regime also show a signiﬁcant effect of order ﬂow.
The scope for such an effect is, of course, much narrower for credibly ﬁxed regimes
or successfully managed regimes than for ﬂoating exchange rates, but it is still a sig-
niﬁcant effect. Given the lower volatility of the currencies under these regimes, the
33effect of order ﬂow is surprisingly strong. This is evidence that even if there is still a
debate in the literature on the structural cause of an order ﬂow effect, the effect is too
strong and pervasive to be neglected by academics, policymakers and practitioners.
In our regressions, we control for possible variables publicly available at the daily
frequency, possible feedback trading effects, and predictability of ﬂows (therefor, for
liquidity disruptions), and ﬁnd the same results independent of market liquidity lev-
els. Since some of the currencies in our sample do not extend back to 1996 we derive
a region-wide order ﬂow measure based on principal component analysis, and ﬁnd
that a region-wide ﬂow into the US dollar causes all currencies to depreciate (against
the US dollar) when studied over the full 15-year sample.
Studying order ﬂow over ﬁnancial crises is important for at least two reasons.
First, periods of turbulence in ﬁnancial markets are the periods that we understand
the least, and the documentation of order ﬂow effects over these periods may prove
useful to academics and policymakers alike. Second, they are also periods of great
uncertainty, and it is exactly in periods of uncertainty that market participants have
the greatest need for aggregating information. Hence, the impact of order ﬂow as
a vehicle for carrying information on dispersed beliefs can be expected to be at its
largest during such periods. We indeed ﬁnd that the impact of order ﬂow is at its
greatest during the ﬁnancial crises in our sample, but the impact over more tranquil
periods is not determined by such “outlier” events. The good news from our analysis
for policy-makers is that the liquidity of markets has improved sufﬁciently over the
15 years, making markets more resilient to shocks.
This paper is an initial attempt to utilize a new and long data set on order ﬂow,
focusing on documenting the robustness of order ﬂow and laying out a number of
simple facts. Further research is clearly warranted, both on the relationship between

















Note: Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests have been run using a constant. Optimal lag-length has been chosen using the Modiﬁed
Akaike Information Criterion (MAIC).  and  denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The sample
length is January 8, 1996 – October 5, 2011.
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